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Application on Fault Tree Analysis in Railway Power Supply Systems 
Tinkin Ho1, Shaokuan Chen2, Baohua Mao3  
Abstract 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is presented to model the reliability of a railway traction 
power system in this paper. First, the construction of fault tree is introduced to integrate 
components in traction power systems into a fault tree; then the binary decision diagram 
(BDD) method is used to evaluate fault trees qualitatively and quantitatively. The 
components contributing to the reliability of overall system are identified with their 
relative importance through sensitivity analysis. Finally, an AC traction power system is 
evaluated by the proposed methods.  
Keywords   
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1 Introduction 
Electrified railway has played an important and evolutionary role in modern 
transportation for its huge capacity, high efficiency and low pollution. Traction power 
systems supply continuous and adequate power of electricity to the locomotives in 
railway operation. There are numerous inter-connecting components in the traction 
power systems (Hill, 1994), both AC and DC, with complex structure and each of them 
is subject to certain lifetime. Analyzing reliability and maintenance therefore become 
essential to keep traction power systems in good operation, especially without the 
luxury of redundancy as adopted in common power systems (Ho et al.).  
As for the studies on reliability evaluation of a railway system and its traction 
power supply system, there have been some related literatures in the last decade. 
Fukuoka developed a network-type reliability evaluation model, Type State Influence 
Diagram, to denote the complicated dependency among subsystems (Fukuoka, et al, 
2002). Cosulich et al. (1996) applied a probabilistic approach based on stochastic 
reward nets to estimate the vehicle performances including reliability, availability and 
maintainability, in the Italian High Speed Railway System. Wang et al. (2005) presented 
an analytical method of reliability of railway catenary system combining radial basis 
neural networks, finite element analysis with Monte Carlo simulation. Tsang and Ho 
(2002) demonstrated the application of reliability-centred maintenance (RCM) process 
to analyse and develop preventive maintenance tasks for the 25 kV electrical power 
supply system in the Hong Kong Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC).  
More studies on the reliability analysis of electrical components or vehicles (Berg 
et al, 1998; Avery, 1998; Keen, 1998) rather than the whole system in railway traction 
power systems are found. In this paper, a new method based on fault tree analysis (FTA) 
is proposed to evaluate the overall reliability of a railway traction power supply system. 
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Through FTA, a traction power system is logically expressed by structurally interrelated 
components and its overall reliability is calculated by known reliability functions of 
components. Furthermore, the critical components, which more likely lead to failure of 
the whole system, are also analytically acquired. This study is crucial to a railway 
traction power system in reliable operation and effective scheduling maintenance.  
2 Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis, FTA, is one of the principal methods of complex systems safety 
analysis. Bell Telephone Laboratories first developed its concept in 1962 for the U.S. 
Air Force for use with the Minuteman system (Fussell, 1976). For four decades, FTA 
has been widely applied in different fields, such as nuclear systems (Vesely et al, 1981; 
Cummings, 1975), coal mine escape ways (Goodman, 1988) and railway systems 
(Hudoklin et al, 1992). FTA is basically a top-down and graphical approach to failure 
analysis starting with an undesirable event called a top event and its procedure is 
determined by individual or combined lower level failures or events, which can cause 
those top events. The values of FTA include (Fussell, 1976): a) directing the analysis to 
ferret out failures; b) pointing out the aspects of the system important to the failure of 
interest; c) providing visibility of the overall system to management; d) providing 
options for qualitative and quantitative systems reliability analysis; e) allowing focus on 
one particular system failure at a time; f) providing an insight into system behaviour.  
2.1 Fault tree construction  
The three major steps of FTA are identified as the definition of the top event, the 
construction of the fault tree and its evaluation (Wallace et al, 2000). The symbols 
shown in Figure 1 represent specific types of faults and normal events in FTA. The 
rectangle defines an event that is the output of a logic gate and is dependent on the type 
of logic gate and the inputs to the logic gate. The circle defines a basic inherent failure 
of a system element when operated within its design specifications. It is therefore a 
primary failure, and is also referred as a generic failure. The diamond represents a 
failure, other than a primary failure, that is purposely not developed further.  
   
Fig. 1 Symbols for Events and Logic Gates 
Gates are applied to represent logical connections existing among events. The OR 
gate describes a situation where the output event exists if one or more of the input 
events exist. The AND gate describes the logical operation that requires the coexistence 
of all input events to produce the output event. The symbols are shown in Figure 1.  
Before the construction of fault trees, a thorough understanding of the system must 
be acquired, especially the structure of system and the function of components involved. 
The fault tree is so structured that the sequence of events leading to the undesired event 
are shown below the top event and are logically related to the undesired event by OR 
and AND gates. The input events to each logic gate that are also outputs of other logic 
gates at a lower level are shown as rectangle. These events are developed further until 
the sequence of events lead to basic causes of interest, called "basic events". The basic 
events appear as circles and diamonds at the bottom of the fault tree and represent the 
limit of resolution of the fault tree. Figure 2 is an example of a fault tree. 
 
Fig 2 An example of a fault Tree   
2.2 Fault tree evaluation  
The evaluation of the fault tree can be either qualitative, quantitative, or both, 
depending upon the scope of the analysis. The objective of fault tree evaluation is to 
determine if there is an acceptable level of safety in the proposed system design. 
Qualitative evaluation usually pinpoints the critical reasons or events causing the failure 
of system while quantitative evaluation determines the probability of system failure.  
The minimum cut set (MCS) algorithm is commonly used to carry out qualitative 
evaluation (Fussell et al, 1972). A cut set is a set of basic events whose occurrences lead 
to the top events. A cut set is minimal if it cannot be reduced and it still insures the 
occurrence of the top event. The logical expression of occurrence of top event, ( )Y , can 
be given as Eq.(1) and is also called qualitative evaluation or min cut representation.  
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where iY  is a Boolean indicator variable of basic events; 1 2, ,..., nK K K  denote the 
minimum cut sets of basic events; n  is the number of minimum cut sets;  and   
represent logical AND and OR operators respectively. One goal of FTA is to calculate 
the probability of top events occurrences and it is also useful to evaluate the importance 
of min cut sets to the top event or the importance of the specified basic events to the top 
event. Quantitative evaluation is carried out by the Inclusion-Exclusion Principle 
(Henley et al, 1981) and the probability of top events occurrence is expressed as below. 
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where ( )iP K  denotes the probability of occurrence of minimum cut sets iK .  
Unfortunately, at least 12n  terms have to be calculated in Eq.(2) and the computational 
demands become very high when n  is reasonably large. There is a more feasible 
method to calculate the probability of top events according to the disjoint sum of 
minimum cut sets and the expression is described as Eq.(3).  
  1 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i n nP P K P K P K P K P K P K P K P K           (3) 
where iK  is the opposite event of iK .  
2.3 Importance of components and minimum cut sets 
There is an orderly arrangement of components or MCSs, which perform some 
tasks or functions in a traction power system. It is clear that some are more critical with 
respect to the functionality of the system than others. Such arrangement of components 
or MCSs can be quantified by their reliability importance. Measuring reliability 
importance of components or MCSs results in two direct benefits: one is to identify 
critical components or MCSs and improve the overall reliability at minimum cost or 
effort; the other is to suggest the most efficient way to diagnose system failure by 
generating a maintenance order checklist (Lambert, 1975). Several commonly adopted 
definitions of the reliability importance of components and MCSs are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1 Definitions of reliability importance of components and MCSs 
Names Definitions Illuminations 
Birnbaum’s 
importance 
  (1 , ( )) (0 , ( ))i i iI t g F t g F t   
(1 , ( ))ig F t  and (0 , ( ))ig F t  respectively denote the 
probability that top event occurs when event i  occurs 
or not by time t .  
Criticality 
importance 
   (1, ( )) (0 , ( )) ( )
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i i i
i
g F t g F t F t
I t
g F t
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( )iF t  is the probability that event i  occurs by time 
t ; ( ( ))g F t  is the probability that the top event occurs 
by time t ; others are same as above. 
Vesely-Fussell’s 
importance 
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( ( )) Prob ( ) 1ii kg F t q    , ( )ik q  is the Boolean 
indicator variable for the union of all cut sets that contain 
basic event i ; others are same as above. 
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( )if t  is the density function of ( )iF t ; others are same 
as above. 
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  is the probability of cut set sK ; others are 
same as above. 
It is necessary that the importance orders of components or MCS’s are confirmed 
after they are obtained through the above definitions. According to this order, sensitivity 
analysis of a component or MCS can be carried out. The order of importance is 
confirmed by an integral expression defined as Eq.(4). 
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T
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where ( )iI t  denotes the importance functions of the component or MCS i , T  is 
the time-window under consideration. 
3 Reliability modelling of railway power supplies 
In electrified railway, power is transmitted to electrical railway locomotives and 
vehicles mainly using DC or three-phase AC networks. A traction power system usually 
consists of a number of major components, such as feeding transformers, circuit 
breakers, overhead cables, insulators and bonding. Power for AC traction is obtained 
from utility supply system, at transmission or sub-transmission voltage level, through 
traction feeding substations. 25kV traction network at 50 or 60Hz is the most commonly 
adopted system. The rail line is usually divided into a number of isolated feeding 
systems and each section is fed by a single-phase supply from a transformer within the 
section. Power is carried to the trains through overhead catenary and current takes the 
rails as return paths. Adjacent sections are supplied by different phases of a three-phase 
network and they are separated by track neutral. Provisions of isolators and switchgear 
are necessary for track neutral and parallel sections to enable continual feeding in cases 
of failures and outages by isolating certain faulty equipment or section or even 
reconfiguring to a different feeding network.  
 
Fig 3  An AC railway traction feeding system 
DC systems are operated at much lower voltages. 600V, 750V and 1.5kV are the 
typical figures. The DC traction power comes from trackside rectifier substations linked 
to the AC distribution network. Each feeding substations covers a section of track but 
there is normally no isolation between adjacent sections. The section length is 
substantially shorter because of the lower distribution voltage level. This study focuses 
on AC railway traction. Figure 3 shows a typical AC railway traction feeding system. 
Reliability of traction power systems is modelled on two levels, component and 
system. Failure data of components are collected and analyzed on component level. As a 
result, the reliability distribution functions of components are mathematically obtained. 
FTA is then applied to evaluate the system reliability of traction power supplies based 
on the individual reliability of components as acquired before. 
3.1 Data analysis on component level 
Reliability data of components usually derive from two sources. The first one, 
observed data, is from a controlled life test and the second, field data, is observed in 
actual operation. Reliability model of components is usually obtained by a 
nonparametric or parametric method. In the former, no assumption is made on reliability 
distribution, other than that it is continuous, and, in some cases, strictly increasing as a 
function of time. The empirical survivor distribution, probability plotting paper, 
Kaplan-Meier Estimator and Nelson’s Estimator, and the total time on test are 
commonly used techniques to determine the reliability distribution (Rausand et al, 
2004). In the latter, some common reliability distributions, such as binomial, Possion, 
exponential, Weibull, or inverse Guassian distributions, are first assumed and then their 
parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood or Bayesian methods (Pham, 2003).               
3.2 Reliability analysis on system level 
3.2.1 FTA model of traction power system 
Reliability of traction power systems is constructed through the FTA process. The 
failure of overall system is defined as the top event and those of components are 
regarded as the basic events. The interactions of events are transmitted through inputs 
and outputs of logic gates. The track section, between A and B, of a typical AC system 
in Figure 3 is modelled into a fault tree, which is shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4 The fault tree for Section A-B in AC power system 
Basic events of components in the fault tree are categorized into 3 groups: 
Failures to circuit breakers: E1, E2, E4, E5, E8, E9, E13, E14, E16, E17, E19, E20, 
E23, E24, E28, E29. 
    Failures to switchgear: E6, E11, E21, E26. 
Failures to transformers: E3, E18. 
3.2.2 BDD method 
When compared with the conventional method (Henley et al, 1981) and the Sharp 
algorithm (Shi et al, 1993), a binary decision diagram (BDD) is faster and more efficient 
to qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate a fault tree (Akers, 1978; Rauzy, 1993; 
Carrasco et al, 1999; Way et al, 2000; Jung et al, 2004). The BDD method is a graphical 
tool encoding Shannon’s decomposition of a formula (Rauzy, 1993). Actually, it is used 
to not only analyze a fault tree through converting a fault tree to a BDD (Reay et al, 
2002), but also directly encode its minimum cut sets (Rauzy, 1993). The disjoint sum of 
minimum cut sets of a fault tree is calculated through the BDD method. 
Shannon’s decomposition 
The Shannon’s decomposition is succinctly defined in terms of the ternary 
If-Then-Else (ITE) connective as represented by Eq.(5). 
                 1 0 1 0( , , )x x x xite x x x                              (5) 
    where x  is one of Boolean decision variables. The functions 1x   and 0x   are 
Boolean functions of   when 1x   and 0x  , respectively. The recursive use of 
ITE connectives is the core of the BDD algorithm that provides an important alternative 
way to represent fault trees. The fault tree in Figure 2 can be logically expressed 
as: ( ) ( )a b c f h d e f g          , where   and   are logical OR and AND 
operators. The expression is then represented by the recursive use of ITE connectives.      
( ,1, ( ,1, ( ,1, ( ,1, ( ,1, ( , ( ,1, ( ,1,0)),0))))))ite a ite b ite c ite h ite f ite g ite d ite e    (6) 
Binary decision diagram 
A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a directed acyclic graph. A BDD has two 
leaves: 0 and 1 encoding the two corresponding constant functions. Each internal node 
encodes an ITE connective, i.e. it is labelled with a variable x  and has two out-edges. 
These two edges are called 0-edge and 1-edge. The leaf at 1-edge denotes the function 
value when its root equals to 1 and the one at 0-edge denotes the function value when its 
root equals to 0. Such procedure is repeated until each leaf is set to 0 or 1. The ITE 
Eq.(6) can be graphically denoted in a binary tree format as shown in Figure 5.  
   a b c f h d e f g       
   b c f h d e f g      
   c f h d e f g     
   f h d e f g    
   f d e f g   
 d e g 
d e
 
Fig. 5 BDD associated with example fault tree in Figure 1 
Minimum cut sets and disjoint sum 
Through the BDD method, minimum cut sets and their disjoint sum of a fault tree 
can be obtained easily. To acquire minimum cut sets, a trace is carried out from a leaf, 
which equals to 1, back to the root. All nodes which have 1-edge constitute a minimum 
cut set in such trace. Similarly, to acquire the disjoint sum of minimum cut sets, the 
same trace is carried out. It is noted that all nodes in this trace are involved and the 
nodes which have 0-edge is expressed by their opposite events. For this fault tree, its 
minimum cut sets are as follows: 
                | , , , , , , , ,i i sK K K a b c f h d g e g    
The disjoint sum of minimum cut sets is shown as follows: 
              , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,a a b a b c a b c h a b c f h a b c d f g h a b c d e f g h  
Therefore, the reliability distribution of this fault tree is calculated through Eq.(7). 
                             
                                   
P P a P a P b P a P b P c P a P b P c P h P a P b P c P f P h
P a P b P c P d P f P g P h P a P b P c P d P e P f P g P h
    
 
 (7) 
In practice, a fault tree is usually constructed with numerous basic events and 
complex structure and it is impossible to describe its reliability distribution completely 
in a simple mathematical expression. For the convenience of further analysis, fitting 
function is adopted to approximate the real distribution on the scatter with data points. It 
is then possible to maintain and repair large systems through reliability evaluation 
functions even though small approximation is involved.  
3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
From Section 2.3, the order of importance of components or MCSs can be 
calculated by Eq.(4). It is however necessary to attain the mean time to failure (MTTF) 
of the overall system varies when MTTF of some of components in the system changes. 
Sensitivity analysis is usually used to represent the variation. The sensitivity of failure 
due to a specific component is defined as Eq.(8). 
          MTTF MTTF
MTTF
                                (8) 
    where MTTF  denotes the mean time to failure of system on the original 
condition and it is defined as  
0
R t dt
 ; MTTF   denotes the mean time to failure of 
system while the lifetime of the specific component is changed. 
4 Example and Discussions 
An AC railway traction power system as shown in Figure 3 is modelled into a fault 
tree in Figure 4 with the proposed FTA method. The reliability characteristics of 
components in this system are given in Table 2. The reliability analysis of the overall 
system, the importance and sensitivity analysis of components are introduced.   
Table 2 Reliability functions of components for AC power section 
Failure type Components Type of reliability Time Parameter 
function Unit 
Failures to circuit 
breakers 
E1,E2,E4,E5,E8,E9,E13,E14,E16, 
E17,E19,E20,E23, E24, E28, E29 
Two-parameter Weibull week 1000, 1.5    
Failures to switchgear E6, E11, E21, E26 Two-parameter Weibull week 1500, 0.8    
Failures to 
transformers 
E3, E18 Two-parameter Weibull week 2000, 2.5    
4.1 Reliability analysis 
There are a total of 81 minimum cut sets and 81 terms of their disjoint sum in this 
fault tree and the reliability distribution function of this traction power system is fitted 
on the scatter data, which are calculated by Eq.(3), as below.    
  1.932exp
445.1
tR t
        
 
The MTTF of this traction power system is calculated as below. 
   1200
0 0
394.674MTTF R t dt R t dt
     Weeks 
In addition, the comparison of computation time is listed in Table 3 between the 
BDD method and the Sharp algorithm (Shi et al, 1993). The algorithm are programmed 
in Visual C++6.0 and the software is run on a PC with Pentium 4 2.8GHz CPU and 
512M memory. The BDD method only consuming 1.125 seconds is obviously much 
more efficient than the Sharp algorithm from Table 3.   
   Table 3 Comparing computation time among evaluation methods  
Evaluation methods BDD method Sharp algorithm 
Computation time (s) 1.125  12080.672 
4.2 Importance of components 
Even though a railway traction power system consists of numerous components, 
their contributions to the reliability of overall system are different due to their functions 
and locations. Combining the reliability analysis of overall system and the calculation of 
importance of components proposed in Section 3.2 and 2.3, the critical components of 
the proposed traction power system are obtained in this section. Table 4 shows the order 
of Birnbaum’s importance function of the primary components by the integral method 
represented in Eq.(4).   
Table 4 The integral Birnbaum's importance of most primary components in the AC power system 
No. 
Primary 
Components 
Fitting Function 
Integral 
Importance 
1 E18 
20 7 17 6 13 5 10 4
8 3 6 2 6
( ) 1.171 10 5.687 10 1.101 10 1.05 10
          4.673 10 4.567 10 0.002118 4.056 10
I t t t t t
t t t
   
  
        
      
 209.556 
2 E16,E17,E23 
21 7 17 6 14 5 11 4
8 3 6 2
( ) 8.351 10 4.034 10 7.753 10 7.289 10
          3.089 10 1.451 10 0.002126 0.0002045
I t t t t t
t t t
   
 
        
     
 204.601 
3 E11 
21 7 17 6 14 5 11 4
8 3 6 2
( ) 9.071 10 4.166 10 7.459 10 6.296 10
          2.155 10 1.311 10 0.001906 0.0003694
I t t t t t
t t t
   
 
        
     
 107.865 
4 E1,E2,E9,E13,E14 
21 7 17 6 14 5 11 4
8 3 6 2
( ) 6.041 10 2.763 10 4.885 10 3.963 10
          1.119 10 3.031 10 0.001861 0.0007966
I t t t t t
t t t
   
 
        
     
 102.089 
5 E3 
21 7 17 6 14 5 11 4
8 3 6 2
( ) 6.644 10 2.908 10 4.835 10 3.532 10
          6.769 10 4.582 10 0.001943 0.0002851
I t t t t t
t t t
   
 
        
     
 80.3332 
 
Table 5 lists the orders of primary components in such traction power system under 
different definitions. The contributions of components to overall system reliability are 
determined by their functions and locations. For example, E18 is universally considered 
as the most important component in the system.     
Table 5 The order of importance of components under different definitions 
Order 
Birnbaum’s 
importance 
Criticality 
importance 
Vesely-Fussell’s 
importance 
Barlow-Proschan’s 
importance 
1 E18 E18 E18 E18 
2 E16,E17,E23 E11 E11 E11 
3 E11 E16,E17,E23 E16,E17,E23 E16,E17,E23 
4 E1,E2,E9,E13,E14 E1,E2,E9,E13,E14 E1,E2,E9,E13,E14 E1,E2,E9,E13,E14 
5 E3 E6 E5 E19 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis of system is carried out to quantitatively characterize the 
reliability of the proposed traction power system when the lifetimes of primary 
components, also called critical components here, are prolonged or shorten at different 
levels: 140%, 120%, 80% and 60%.  
Table 6 The variance of the system's MTTF when components' mean lifetime is changed 
No( j )  Change Rate of 
Components 
MTTF of System in 
Group 1 ( j ) 
MTTF of System in 
Group 2 ( j ) 
MTTF of System in 
Group 3 ( j ) 
1 140% 397.476(0.71%) 536.046 (35.82%) 550.452(39.47%) 
2 120% 396.45(0.45%) 458.335(16.13%) 472.188(19.64%) 
3 100% 394.674(0%) 394.674 (0%) 394.674 (0%) 
4 80% 391.24(-0.87%) 324.225(-17.85%) 316.844(-19.72%) 
5 60% 383.544(-2.82%) 248.013(-37.16%) 237.357(-39.86%) 
The analysis is divided into three groups which have different formations of 
components as follows: only E18 in Group 1; E18, E16, E17, E23, E11, E1, E2, E9, E13, 
E14, E3 in Group 2 and all components in Group 3. The details of the analysis are listed 
in Table 6. The results of the sensitivity analysis reveal that maintaining critical 
components simultaneously in Group 2 has almost the same improvement as when all 
components are maintained. It is more cost-effective to improve the reliability of critical 
components than individual one or all components. 
5 Conclusions 
FTA is applied to model an AC railway traction power system and evaluate its 
reliability qualitatively and quantitatively in this study. FTA is essentially a graphical 
tool on logical operators and it is useful for reliability analysis of large systems. The 
inter-connecting components, which have individual reliability and functions in traction 
power systems, are integrated in a fault-tree model. The efficient BDD method is 
introduced to calculate the minimum cut sets and their disjoint sum of the fault tree. 
Moreover, important components or basic events are not only obtained in traction power 
systems, but the reliability distribution function of the system is established. Finally, 
importance of components and sensitivity analysis are used to identify the most 
important components and their impacts on the overall reliability.  
The example study shows that FTA enables simple analysis on the reliability of 
complex traction power systems. The BDD method is a more computationally efficient 
solution. In practice, engineers and managers are able to determine a set of critical 
components first and then allocate the appropriate resources for maintenance activities.  
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